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Abstract
The major contributi on of Max Weber, according to the author, is to be seen in 
the concept of the “modern world” and its desti ny as a society based on rati onal 
calculati on. Such modern rati onality is technically equipped and formal from a logical 
point of view. It provides a link between desired social goals and available resources to 
reach them. It is also a challenge for the decision-making power groups, unable to face 
the consequences of such rati onality that begins as a liberati on from traditi onal values 
and ends up in some sort of “steel cage”. Weber does not seem capable of suggesti ng 
a way out of this social and politi cal contradicti on.
At the basis of the lasti ng, even growing, fascinati on of Max Weber as man and thinker 
there are probably two reasons. First, there is an essenti al reason: Weber tackles a 
central theme, sti ll today at the heart of our concerns, and to which he returns in all 
his works, more or less directly - the nature, directi on, and future of the “modern 
world.” Second, there is the questi on of the method in the broad sense of the word, 
including the theoreti cal-conceptual apparatus and specifi c research techniques, or 
an especially immediate démarche.
What is, for Weber, the “modern world”?
It is a world ruled and defi ned by “rati onal calculati on.” In Weber’s perspecti ve, the 
modern world is that of total calculability. The constructi on of this modern world 
as one rati onally calculated or calculable passes through two basic phases: (a) 
“disenchantment” (Entzauberung der Welt), and (b) the laicizati on and routi nizati on 
of the “profession” (Beruf), which becomes mundane as a specifi c bureaucrati c 
methodical competence, instead of a “calling” or religious vocati on.
It seems hardly necessary to note that this two-layered process of social transformati on 
takes place and develops in the framework of a sti ll more radical passage - a real 
1  I am greatly indebted for long and fruitf ul discussion on these subjects to the late Professor Benjamin Nelson, a good friend 
and an unforgett able intellectual sti mulus.
2  From Social Research (autumn 1982).
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historical leap - wherein we have a transiti on from a magicoreligious traditi onalism, 
a vision of one’s desti ny which is essenti ally transcendent, of which we might say 
with Goethe that `Alles Vergängliche / ist nur ein Gleichnis.” We move on to a society 
characterized by a process of increasingly large-scale industrializati on, with the 
openly declared intenti on of producing its own values, and which furthermore does 
not acknowledge the binding force of any criterion of evaluati on outside the internal 
correctness of its own proceedings. Once transcendence has collapsed, or, more exactly, 
once transcendent principles have been translated and reduced to methodical daily 
habits (at the basis of which Weber someti mes seems to perceive sti ll the refl ecti on of 
ancient religious values no longer consciously grasped or accepted as such), Weber’s 
modern world seems to be in a Nietzschean sense “human, all too human.”
The contrast with types of preceding societi es - traditi onal paleotechnical, preindustrial 
- all linked to a marked, all pervasive, magicoreligious symbolism, is so strong as to be 
presented as a qualitati ve break. As Huizinga, for example, comments,
the spirit of that ti me was so full of Christ that the slimmest analogy with the 
Lord’s life or passion which any act or thought might have, would instantly 
summon up his image. A poor nun bringing fi rewood into the kitchen saw herself 
as bearing the cross. The simple idea of bearing wood was enough to surround 
the acti on with the aura of a supreme act of love. A blind washerwoman takes 
the washtub and washboard for the crib and stable.3
From the Magico-Religious to the Individualized Rational
In the modern world, there is no longer room for this magicoreligious, essenti ally 
otherworldly symbolism. In Weber’s view, at the most it lies in a residual space, 
necessarily desti ned to disappear. The “sense,” the meaning, of the modern, rati onal, 
individualized world can develop only in reverse proporti ons to the gradual withdrawal, 
the so-to-speak contracti on of the magicoreligious sphere. Indeed, as Weber says in 
Economy and Society,
the more intellectualism rejects belief in magic, and thus the processes of the 
world become “disenchanted” [und so die Vorgänge der Welt “entzaubert” 
werden], they lose their magical meaning: they are restricted to “being” and 
“appearing” [geschehen], instead of “meaning” [bedeuten], so the need increases 
for the world, the “conduct of life” [Lebensführung], insofar as they make up a 
whole, to be meaningfully set out and “provided with meaning” [sinnvoll].4
In his usual meti culous manner, Weber analyzes the “paths” whereby “intellectualism” 
- fi rst of all responsible for “disenchantment” - gradually becomes a current shared 
3  Cf. J. Huizinga, L autunno del medioevo (Florence: Sansoni, 1978), p. 264.
4  Cf. M. Weber, Economia e Società (Milan: Ed. Comunità, 1978), 1: 505.
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idea instead of a characteristi c of narrow intellectual circles. It is the typical atti  tude 
of a whole social form and existenti al inclinati on, or an empirically testable character 
proclivity, of a total historical phase. In Weber’s view, the resulti ng collapse of 
“magicoreligious meaning” increases and indeed makes essenti al the responsible 
adopti on of “life conduct’ in itself “meaningful” (sinnvoll), endowed with meaning 
no longer as ti ed to transcendent symbolic meanings and collecti ve-communitarian 
validity, but rather as they emphasize the moral and intellectual responsibility of the 
individual - only now, at last, faced with his knowledge and his god. Weber, therefore, 
not only makes clear the results, but primarily the premises and cultural bases, of the 
process of industrializati on as a universal social one which defi nes the modern world. 
He also stresses the eliti st and typically intellectual nature of those bases, right from 
their evoluti onary-geneti c beginning.5 However, one should not thereby believe in a 
Weber indulgent toward a formulati on of the descripti on and interpretati on - if not 
the explanati on - of social phenomena in a monocausal sense. Nor, on the basis of the 
undeniable implicati on in certain passages taken out of context, should one support a 
basically “evoluti onisti c” Weber, as latt erly Talcott  Parsons has done. This demonstrates 
a fundamental misunderstanding of Weber’s positi on - which, however, from his point 
of view, had the advantage of making Weber a kind of forerunner of “social acti on,” 
as was to be developed by the author of The Social System in collaborati on with 
sociologists and social analysts running from Robert Bales to Edward A. Shils, George 
C. Homans, and Neil Smelser.
In Weber, the analysis of the process of rati onalizati on (which lies at the basis of the 
coming of the modern world and, in essence, defi nes it and makes it up) makes no 
concession to the theory of the “great evoluti onary universals” which in Parsons’s 
view can be identi fi ed in the growth of all human societi es. In the same way, he is very 
careful regarding the ever-possible confusion between analyti cal concepts - needful 
for research as mental constructs for meaningfully reordering the immense mass of 
empirical data - and concrete historical situati ons, nonreducible in their specifi city. 
Far from the oft en empty generalizati on which characterizes Parsons’ method, with 
its curious identi fi cati on of social theory with the simple constructi on of basically 
arbitrary, excessively generalized, abstract models - to the point of tumbling into 
theoreti cal vagueness and the generic - Weber is concerned with identi fying what is 
unique in the historical experience of the West. He strongly criti cizes the evoluti onary, 
holisti c tendencies both in their cumulati ve and mechanisti c form (Spencer) and their 
historical dialecti cal one (Marx).
5  For the cultural bases of the process of industrializati on, I should like to menti on the work of the historian of the English 
coal industry at the ti me of the fi rst "industrial revoluti on," J. E. Nef, The Cultural Foundati on of Industrial Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958); for a further treatment of this problem, see my Macchina e uomo nella società industriale 
(Turin: ERI, 1962).
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It is easy, especially regarding “disenchantment” and “rati onalizati on,” to adopt a 
misleading view of Weber’s thought. Weber can be reproved for a limitati on, or for 
a certain Nietzschean taste for the aphorism, the fragmentary, but in reality this is 
his great asset. I do not think it correct to regard this as solely the refl ecti on of his 
logical philosophical positi on as a neo-Kanti an, which excludes any generalizati on on 
the ulti mate nature of the social phenomena dealt with, just as it would be hard to 
fi nd in Weber the equivalent of a supraindividual reality comparable to Durkheim’s 
representati ons collecti ves. Rather, it should be remembered that Weber always 
clearly disti nguishes between and keeps separate the analyti cal level and specifi c 
historic content. In his analysis of social phenomena, Weber is a rigorous individualist, 
applying and achieving a strictly individualist methodological approach, although - 
far from failing into a psychologisti c positi on or one, as has been suggested, close to 
“symbolic interacti onism”  he is solely concerned with large insti tuti onal complexes 
with a basically structuralist outlook.
We shall see later, when we look more directly at the form of Weber’s method, what is 
implied by the contradicti on we have indicated. What should be stressed here is that 
the concept of rati onality, which for Weber underlies the process of rati onalizati on 
is in no way schemati c or intrinsically necessary. It is not necessarily progressive or 
cumulati ve in a unilinear sense. Indeed, it contains a multi plicity of meanings and thus 
is presented basically as a problemati c concept.
Sociological analysis has oft en gone forward by way of a schemati c counterposing of 
historically diﬀ erent situati ons and phases, nicely summarized in an umbrella concept 
such as: community versus society, nature versus culture, economy versus ideology, 
structure versus personality, traditi on versus rati onality, military versus industrial 
society, and so on. As regards these rather mechanical, historically ingenuous dualisms, 
Weber’s positi on appears much more problemati c and complex, and in any case far 
removed from black-and-white interpretati ons. One can even say that he was strongly 
att racted by the contradictory aspects and anti nomies of rati onality.
In this regard, Reinhard Bendix has cited two well-known, convincing examples. 
As against the widespread noti on that Weber’s thought describes a unilinear and 
necessarily progressive development from a magicoreligious epoch to an historical, 
rati onalist-scienti fi c phase, or from a patrimonial type of economic undertaking - or 
one of robbery - to one based on rati onal calculati on (writt en, ongoing accountability, 
with scienti fi c planning of available resources as regards profi t), one should remember 
his analysis of ancient Judaism and Calvin’s teaching in the context of the Protestant 
ethic.6 In the fi rst case we have a decline of the magicoreligious sphere because of the 
rise of prophecy. However, as Weber accurately notes, aft er the Babylonian capti vity, 
the dynamic power of the prophets yields and gives way to ritualized faithfulness to the 
6  Cf. R. Bendix, "Max Weber's Sociology Today", Internati onal Social Science Journal 17 (1965).
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law under the tutelage of the rabbis. Thus here increasing rati onality fi rst determines, 
or accompanies, the broad values of a monotheist religion, only later to debauch 
into the irra ti onality of formalized rituals and the loss of interior meaning regarding 
commandments initi ally rich with symbolic signifi cance. As Weber observed,
the propheti c horizon remained wholly terrestrial, like the oﬃ  cial Babylonian 
one, as against the Greek mysteries and the Orphean religion. Jewish prophecy, 
though linked to the Levites’ care of the soul, was concerned only with the 
desti ny of the people as a whole. Thereby it repeatedly demonstrated its politi cal 
orientati on. The increasing bourgeois rati onalism of a people integrated into the 
relati vely pacifi ed world of the Persian empire, and aft erwards that of Hellenism, 
made the suppression of prophecy possible for the priests.7
As for Calvinism, the analyti c precision with which Weber makes clear the paradox 
of the teaching is well known. This referred to the total inscrutability of divine will as 
well as to the certainty of salvati on. At the same ti me, as regards the practi cal business 
of life, or lived morality, it draws conclusions about methodical living, industry, the 
sancti fi cati on of life, sobriety and saving, and thus about accumulati on and the 
subsequent reinvestment of capital. One starts with uncertainty regarding one’s own 
ultraterrestrial salvati on and ends up with the foundati on of the major Swiss banks. 
This same brilliant nature of Weber’s work has itself created an opportunity for crude 
misunderstanding. Even a cursory reconstructi on of the cultural climate prevailing at 
the ti me Weber’s text saw the light - at the beginning of the century - may be suﬃ  cient 
to let us understand both its success and these defi ciencies in understanding. A major 
success is almost always a great danger. Weber provided the example for an unusual 
heterogenesis of aims, in order to show the complex, multi dimensional character, the 
basic reciprocity, of the relati on between structure and culture. However, Weber’s 
meti culous analyti cal precision has not been given full credit. Bendix himself, as 
Eisenstadt has shown, did not explore his subject profoundly enough, being content 
with a cursory presentati on.8 For Weber, there was no questi on of overthrowing Marx’s 
argument - or more precisely, that of the Marxism of his day, mostly undialecti cal 
and as yet unaware of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 as well as 
of the Grundrisse - but to expose the complex interacti on which cannot a priori be 
established by a wholly theoreti c deducti ve calculati on. It thus requires a specifi c 
historical research of the bi-directi onal relati on between the structure of “material” 
and “ideal” interests.
7  M. Weber, Sociologia delle religioni (Turin: UTET, 1976), pp.1161, 1234.
8  Cf. S. N. Eisenstadt, The Protestant Ethic Thesis in Analyti cal and Comparati ve Context (New York: Random House, 1966): note 
too the introducti on by L. Cavalli to M. Weber, Religione e società (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1968). For an accurate interpretati on, 
oft en methodologically oriented, see J. A. Prade, La Sociologie de la religion chez Max
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The Idea of Interest
We are not thus faced with a counterpositi on between “material interests” and “ideas” 
but rather between two diﬀ erent types of interest. However, the central category is 
always that of interest - also what is involved in the sphere of knowledge which is 
not directly applicable or useful. This must be borne in mind as it helps to explain 
some important aspects of Weber’s Positi on: (1) His rejecti on of vulgar anti  -Marxism 
and his explicit recogniti on of Marxism as one working hypothesis or “ideal-type” 
model, albeit among others. (2) The rejecti on of an all-inclusive conceptual system, 
tendenti ally dogmati cally closed, in favor of the “open system” linked to the value 
choices of the individual. This gives rise to the characteristi c “moderate relati vism” 
(moderated by the major values of the European liberal traditi on which, as we can 
boldly say today, Weber sees as eternally conquered and so beyond questi on). (3) 
The typically Weberian tendency not to be limited to a literally correct reading of the 
theoreti cal texts and the ethic of Protestanti sm and other religions, but rather to be 
concerned with a lived ethic - that is, with ethical precepts as they are manifested 
in everyday existence through the practi cal behavior of determinate individuals and 
social groups. (4) Finally, the profound argument dealing with universal religions, 
immediately relevant to our discussion in that it rests on a dual purpose First, it att empts 
to establish comparati vely in terms of the uniqueness of the historical experience of 
Western Europe (“Nur im Okzident . .”) contrasted with the failure to develop capitalism 
in other parts of the world, governed by other ethical or religious systems, or other 
magicoreligious models. To these last, Weber does not att ribute a necessarily causal 
responsibility in the literal sense for the failure of capitalist development of the West 
European kind, but he sees them as meaningful accomplishments. Second, it tries 
to determine the process of the beginning of rati onalizati on which was to peak and 
be diﬀ used through the triumph of rati onality as a principle of social organizati on 
and a new source of the legiti mati on of power by means of a series of intermediate 
stages which run from “disenchantment of the world” to the camoufl age of religious 
values under fake lay dress. This is Thomas Luckmann’s “invisible religion”. At the 
other extreme these arrive at the scienti fi cally, rati onally determined work of formal 
bureaucrati c orders and ulti mately at the dubious victory of a white-collar world 
peopled by hard-working, malleable men.
What strikes one in Weber’s broad analysis is the precision with which he grasps and 
brings out the traditi onal elements in the innovati ve, rati onalizing processes and at 
the same ti me the factors of change in a rati onal directi on already present in the 
structure of traditi ons. (Some imperfecti ons of form are certainly to be att ributed 
to its posthumous appearance and to the fact that it was edited by J. Winckelmann, 
with great fi delity to the originals.) In this perspecti ve, it would be hard to see in 
Weber a kind of precursor or disti nguished forerunner of the schemati c theories 
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of “secularizati on,” and sti ll less of the current well-known argument concerning 
a supposed “eclipse of the sacred.” The somewhat extemporary nature of these 
and similar theories is clear in the connecti on - so much taken for granted as not 
to require empirical testi ng - between urbanizati on and industrializati on and sti ll 
more between in dustrializati on and the scienti fi c atti  tude, based on the cause-eﬀ ect 
sequence. However, the survival in advanced industrial societi es of many animisti c, 
and someti mes crudely anthropomorphic, beliefs shows that acceptance of a cultural 
model based on rigorous rati onality in a scienti fi c sense is sti ll sporadic and in any 
event liable to major excepti ons.
Rationality as a Problematic Concept
One can further plausibly argue that the examples quoted by Weber in support of his 
case (especially as material proving the Protestant ethic to be a factor of economic 
development and the “spirit of capitalism” as a way of life are not wholly credible. That 
Benjamin Franklin represents clearly a typifi cati on of the Protestant ethic in practi ce 
is somewhat dubious; likewise, or even more so, is the example of Fugger, cited by 
Werner Sombart, the disti nguished criti c and opponent of Weber. At any rate, it is not 
a questi on of this: or rather, it is not a questi on of accuracy or adequacy in the literal 
sense of the words, but rather of Weber’s general concepti on regarding the nature of 
the modern world. In Weber’s terms, this nature can be traced to the specifi c forms 
of the process of rati onalizati on, as taken on from ti me to ti me in the diﬀ erent fi elds 
of the - analyti cally discernable - social. This process is seen in terms of a general 
concept of a rati onality never completely or defi niti vely stated, which varies and is 
transformed in the diﬀ erent sectors of social life, from the religious to the economic, 
politi cal, juridical, and organizati onal  - bureaucrati c.
Weberian rati onality is thus essenti ally problemati c. As for that Eurocentrism which, 
for Weber as for
the scholars of his generati on is unconsciously taken as an initi al premise, one might 
say that rati onality is a unique characteristi c of Western European history; at the same 
ti me, it is a normati ve term, an historic task to be performed, a real Grenzbegriﬀ  an 
idea-limit. As such it is positi ve; but at the very moment it seems to be historically 
achieved, and at the point of becoming dominant it reverses itself and takes on a 
negati ve connotati on in the context of a totally administered society and a tendenti ally 
totalizing bureaucrati c formal organizati on which cheats the individual out of his 
rati onality in order to set him in the name of eﬃ  ciency in a “steel cage.”
Weber’s rati onality fl uctuates therefore between radical anti nomies. It seems to be 
att ached to the individual, his decisions and acti ons. In this context it is not, cannot 
be, intersubjecti ve. The romanti c pathos of this does indeed have its roots in the oft -
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stated awareness which makes the individual - it is for him alone, in his solitude - to 
decide and act according to his “feeling.” “Culture,” he says,
is an area closed oﬀ  by the meaningless infi nity of the future of the world, to 
which directi on and meaning is ascribed from man’s point of view. It is such also 
for men who confl ict with a concrete culture as though with a mortal enemy, 
and who aspire to a “return to nature.” They can arrive at this positi on only in 
that they refer concrete culture to their ideas on value.9
Yet Weber does not shrink from formulati ons which at ti mes seem to point to a 
general characteristi c of modem humanity in rati onality, one which certainly has its 
historical roots in Western Europe, but according to a universalisti c view which makes 
one remember a scienti sti c element, at ti mes clearly technocrati c in the Veblen of The 
Place of Science in Modern Civilizati on.10 There are lesser writers, pointless to menti on 
here, representati ve of a “middle culture” - for instance, the famous author of The Two 
Cultures and the Scienti fi c Revoluti on.11 In Wissenschaft  als Beruf, Weber says that
from the practi cal point of view, intellectualisti c nati onalizati on directed toward 
science and scienti fi cally oriented technique does not indicate a general 
progressive knowledge of the condi ti ons of life surrounding us. Rather, it points 
to something quite diﬀ erent: the awareness or the belief that everything in 
principle can be mastered by reason. This in turn means the disen chantment 
of the world. One no longer needs to resort to magic to master or to ingrati ate 
oneself with the spirits, as does the savage, for whom like power exists. Reason and 
technical means provide this. Above all, this is the meaning of intellectualizati on 
as such.12
The Individual’s Social Action
It could be considered that Weber sees the weight of reason in human history as 
decisive. In reality, this is not so. At least parti ally and also in the West, social acti on 
escapes from its control. For Weber, social acti on is an individual act which is socialized 
by anti cipati ng and reacti ng to the acts of other people. As he said,
as with any acti on, social acti on may also be determined: (a) in a rati onal way 
as regards the end - by expectati ons regarding the atti  tude of objects of the 
outside world and other men, making use of these expectati ons as “conditi ons” 
or “means” for rati onally willed and calculated ends, as follows - (b) in a manner 
rati onal as regards the value - from the conscious belief in the unconditi onal 
9  Cf. M. Weber, II metodo delle scienze storico-sociali (Turin: Einaudi, 1967), p.96.
10  T. Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilizati on (New York: Hoebsch, 1919).
11  C. P. Snow, Le due culture e la rivoluzione scienti fi ca (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1970)
12  Cf. M. Weber, Il lavoro intellett uale come professione (Turin: Einaudi, 1977), pp.19 - 20.
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value in itself (whether ethical, aestheti c, religious or interpretable in other 
ways) of a parti cular piece of behavior as such, leaving out from its result; (c) 
aﬀ ecti vely - by senti ments and current states of sensati on; (d) traditi onally - by 
an acquired habit.13
Parsons’ criti cisms on this point manifest a deep misunderstanding (as we have noted 
above and elsewhere). Weber is not concerned to construct the total, necessarily reifi ed 
“social system.” He is aware that this would mean freezing history and producing an 
abstract exercise in modeling: this would possibly help to reorder the data concerning 
the existi ng situati on, but it would not be possible to take social change into account. 
The “grand visions,” the all-inclusive social systems for Weber can only be the product 
of basically useless intellectual exercises. Anyone, he said with a certain irony, who 
wants a vision should go to the cinema: on the other hand anyone who longs for 
sermons should go to a monastery. These aforementi oned comments, which may 
seem ironic, distant, and tough, are really self-deprecatory, almost reaching the level 
of pathos. They contain the core, the nature of the concept of “disenchantment”. In 
fact, he said, if the desti ny of an age which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is 
in know that we cannot grasp the meaning of cosmic development on the basis of 
the conclusion of the investi gati on, however perfectly established, the consequence 
is logically inevitable. The responsibility for “meaning,” once it has departed from the 
great traditi ons, or the authority of the “eternal yesterday” as its basic and essenti al 
foundati on, rests fi nally on the individual’s decisions. The “meaning” is no longer 
given: to Weber, we as individuals must be “capable of creati ng it ourselves.”
Because of this basic reason and logical bond, Weber speaks of a “polytheism of 
values,” the “right to the unilateral analysis of reality,” and the basic necessity of 
“presuppositi ons” declared and decided upon by the individual who undertakes the 
specifi c research, so as to succeed in determining what is important and what is not.14 
Rati onality is thus handed over to the individual and his presuppositi ons; as already 
noted, appears as a highly anti nomic concepti on, whose meaningful connecti ons are 
to be found within the general polarity which for Weber is to be found in the tension-
disti ncti on between material and formal rati onality. In most of the areas menti oned 
above, this tension-disti ncti on parti cularly involves the economic, juridical sector. 
Weber said that an economic acti on should be formally defi ned as rati onal to the extent 
that the “economic thrust” essenti al to any rati onal economy can be interpreted, and 
should be interpreted, in numerical expressions, of “calculati on,” wholly cutti  ng out 
the technical formulati on of these calculati ons, and thereby the monetary or natural 
nature of their esti mati ons. Nonetheless, this concepti on is univocal, at least in the 
sense that the monetary form represents the highest level of such formal esti mability 
13  Weber, Economia e società, 1:21 - 22.
14  Weber, II metodo delle scienze storico-sociali, pp. 64, 83.
20     ACADEMICUS - INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL
- naturally, all other things being equal. In contrast, the concept of material rati onality 
takes on very diﬀ erent meanings. It simply expresses this common element - that 
analysis is not sati sfi ed with the fact, which can be stated in a relati vely unequivocal 
manner, and that there must be a rati onal calculati on as regards the aim, using the 
most suitable technical means. However, it gives weight instead to the ethical, politi cal, 
uti litarian, hedonisti c requirements (Forderungen), those of the stratum of equality, or 
indeed any other kind. It measures against them, on the basis of rati onality as regards 
value, or a material goal (Wertrati onal oder material zweckrati onal), the consequences 
of economic acti on even if this be formally rati onal, calculable. One must, however, 
observe that it is always possible, in a totally autonomous form as regards this material 
criti que of the economic eﬀ ect - a criti que which is ethical, aestheti c, and asceti c of the 
intenti on and methods of economic acti vity (Wirtschaft sgesimmung sowohl wie der 
Wirtschaft smitt el). The merely formal (bloss formale) functi on of monetary calculati on 
may appear subordinate or contradictory (subaltern order geradezu... feindlich) with 
their postulates, when confronted with all these forms of criti cism.
Weber also remarks on natural calculati on, and the natural economy which historically 
corresponds to this - that is, the economy which neither knows about nor practi ces 
the use of money. However, as usual, he expresses his own thoughts in analyti cally 
counterposed conceptual frameworks, returning to rati onal calculati on as capital’s 
calculati on, a full and historically unparalleled expression of formal rati onality. He 
does this in order to identi fy the connecti ons and conditi ons which actually make it 
possible. Basically, there are three conditi ons:
(1) Market competi ti on [Marktkampf] between economies which are - at 
least relati vely  autonomous. Prices expressed monetarily are the products 
of struggle and compromise, and thereby the result of clusters of power 
[Machtkonstellati onen].
(2) The highest level of economic acti vity, as a means of orienti ng calculati on, 
is achieved by monetary esti mate in the form of capital’s calculati ons: this 
involves the material presuppositi on of the widest market freedom, in the sense 
of the absence of monopolies, whether these be imposed from without and 
economically irrati onal or voluntary and economically rati onal (that is to say, 
directed on the basis of market possibiliti es).
(3) Not all “demand” [Begehr] in itself, but demand for useful services based on 
buying power, materially determines - through determinati on of the calculati on 
by capital - the producti on of goods in the context of an acquisiti ve economy. 
Thus, for the directi on of producti on, the “constellati on” of marginal uti lity of 
the social stratum living on unearned income is decisive. This stratum has the 
power and inclinati on to acquire a specifi c service for purposes of uti lity.
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In Weber’s outline of these three conditi ons, the extraordinary awareness of the historic 
nature of concepts and kinds of economic relati on is striking: these, in the traditi on of 
classical economics, seemed natural concepts and processes, and by defi niti on non-
modifi able and metahistorical. If only in passing, the att enti on Weber pays to money 
(which is not an innocuous designati on of services of undetermined usefulness, and 
moreover cannot be arbitrarily altered without fundamentally aﬀ ecti ng the nature of 
the prices established by the struggle between individuals) introduces a completely 
politi cal and sociological element into the discussion of this theme; the theme is 
mostly regarded as ideally “indiﬀ erent” and purely technical and is not confronted 
yet by modem monetarists. Witness of this is the work of Milton Freidman and the 
discussions inspired by him.
Weber’s analysis is not just limited to the discussion of macroeconomic conditi ons. It 
follows an examinati on of the moti ves which in a market economy are the “decisive 
sti mulus for economic acti on.” To understand fully the structure of these moti vati onal 
pressures, as well as to avoid any lapse into the purely psychologisti c level, Weber 
clearly conceptualizes - almost running the risk of schemati c presentati on - the 
disti ncti on-tension between market economy and planned economy. In brief, one can 
say that in his view, while in a market economy
the acti vity of parti cular, autonomous forms of the economy is directed also 
autonomously ... in a planned economy, on the other hand, every economic 
acti vity is directed, insofar as it is realized, in conformity with the domesti c 
economy, heteronomously, on the basis of regulati ons which command and 
prohibit, as well as on the basis of a perspecti ve of rewards and punishments.
In the context of the market economy, the sti mulus to economic acti vity is represented 
by three moti vati ons:
(1) For the have-nots by the coercive force of the risk of a total lack of supplies 
for themselves and their dependents (children, wives and ulti mately parents), 
for whom the individual must typically provide, as well as, in various degrees, 
by an internal predispositi on to economic work as a form of life. (2) For those 
who actually enjoy a positi on of privilege, because they have no possessions 
or educati on (in turn determined by possessions), the sti mulus comes from 
possibiliti es of high incomes, ambiti on, and the value conferred on prized types 
of labor (spiritual, arti sti c, technical, etc.). (3) For those who take part in the 
possibiliti es of acquisiti ve enterprises, the sti mulus comes from the risk of 
their own capital and their own opportuniti es for gain, in connecti on with the 
“professional” dispositi on toward rati onal acquisiti on. That is the case insofar 
as this is seen as a “proof” [Bewahrung] of the service itself, and as a form of 
autonomous dominati on over the people who depend on instructi ons from them, 
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and also control over possibiliti es of supplying the wants of an indeterminate 
mass of individuals; their instructi ons thereby have importance for their culture 
or their lives - in short, as a form of power.
Formal Rationality, Material Rationality, and Planning
Let us suppose that instead of a market economy there is, and operates, a planned 
economy. What would its results for structure and psychological-moti vati onal 
“dispositi on” be? First, Weber notes that there would be a certain lessening of 
coercion derived from the risk of the lack of supplies. A planned economy would not 
in fact be able to discharge onto its dependents the results of a potenti ally lesser 
service from the worker. Equally, the autonomy of enterprises’ management would 
diminish, with a subsequent lessening, probably to zero, of the risk to capital, with 
the apparently inevitable recourse to “idealisti c sti muli of an altruisti c nature”. Yet, 
at the same ti me, a planned economy would also have to face up to a more-or-less-
radical diminuti on of formal rati onality, basically linked with monetary calculati on and 
that of capital. There thus arises the problem of the practi cal realizati on of socialism, 
in the sense that formal rati onality b  ased on an esti mate regarding capital which 
allows rati onal accountability, and material rati onality, which obeys ethical needs and 
those of postuti litarian justi ce, diﬀ er from each other so greatly that there arises an 
irreconcilable contradicti on which, in turn, refl ects the basis of the “irrati onality of 
the economy which is one of the roots of any social problemati c, above all that of 
socialism.”
However, it is more in the politi cal sphere than in the economic and juridical ones that 
those characteristi cs which split up the seemingly unitary nature of modern society 
become explosive and reach breaking point. They arise as an impassable obstacle. The 
process of rati onalizati on broadens out here into the formati on of formal bureaucrati c 
orders, from which there grow contradicti ons, oppositi ons, which in Weber’s analysis 
seem irreconcilable. Of the three pure types of legiti mate power, the bureaucrati c type 
would at fi rst sight seem the one logically ti ed to rati onality. In fact, Weber convincingly 
outlines its characteristi cs and presuppositi ons - rati onal and impersonal - as a “cosmos 
of abstract rules and norms established accordingly,” regarding the value, ends, or both, 
as against the other two types of power, traditi onal and charismati c. One might say 
that, with the advent of legal, bureaucrati c power in the formal sense, with a rati onal 
character insofar as it “rests on the belief in the legality of decreed regulati ons, and 
on the right to command of those called upon to exercise (legal) power on the basis of 
these,” the process of rati onalizati on fi nally triumphs. Meanwhile, complementarily, 
on the strictly politi cal plane, on the ruins of the ancient social orders dominated by 
aristocrati c, dynasti c orders, there is proclaimed mass democracy and the modern 
“social” state; that is, alternati vely, the entrepreneurial, planning, all -administering 
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state. Bureaucrati c structure is more than ever necessary. Legal bureaucrati c 
power is inconceivable without its administrati ve apparatus. Furthermore, with its 
characteristi c depersonalizati on of functi ons and, simultaneously, the specializati on 
of responsibiliti es, bureaucrati c structure seems basically to cling to the egalitarianism 
of democracy and its intrinsic need for impersonal rotati on and socializati on of power. 
However, the egalitarianism of the bureaucracy is formal: that which underlies 
democracy is substanti al, unless one wishes to reduce the concept of democracy to 
a simple ensemble of formal procedures, independently of socioeconomic content, 
on the basis of the principle that he who desires democracy must be content with 
this. (This is the conclusion drawn by most American politologues [Lipset, Dahl, Polsky, 
etc.], but also by the Europeans, who follow the same tracks with mini mal variati ons 
[Lepsius, Crozier, Bobbio, Sartori, etc.].)
In fact, as Weber never ti red of pointi ng out, bureaucracy tends to involve society in its 
enti rety, and to deprive politi cians of their functi on by routi nizing them and depriving 
them of authority. The instrument for removing this authority, which foreshadows 
the atrophy of politi cal judgment, is specialized knowledge. This is at the root of the 
insti tuti on of specifi c power (one only controls what one knows) and of the social fi gure 
of the bureaucrat. In fact, the specifi c mode of functi oning of modern bureaucracy, in 
his view, rests on certain general “principles.” First there is
the principle of the spheres of competence of defi nite authoriti es, disciplined 
in a general manner through rules: that is, through administrati ve laws and 
regulati ons. Second, there is the principle of the hierarchy of oﬃ  ces, and the 
series of procedures - a rigidly regulated system of supra- and subordinati on 
of the organisms of authority, with control of the superiors over their inferiors. 
Third, modem oﬃ  ce management is based on documents (agreements) which 
are preserved in the original or in duplicate, and on an apparatus of subaltern 
and clerical functi onaries of all kinds. Fourth, every oﬃ  cial acti vity normally 
presupposes meti culous specialized preparati on. Fift h, oﬃ  cial acti vity claims the 
whole of the bureaucrat’s working capacity. Sixth, the oﬃ  ce procedure of the 
functi onary follows general rules which can be learned. The knowledge of these 
rules is thus a special technique which functi onaries have15.
The Sociopolitical Consequences of Specialized Knowledge
Modern techniques and the economics of the producti on of goods leave specialized 
knowledge out of considerati on. Man thus cannot escape dominati on by the 
bureaucracy, since it is precisely that, in a form indissolubly linked to material, or at 
any rate objecti ve, interests, which ends up by determining individuals’ conditi ons 
of existence. The legal functi onary type therefore seems to leave out the great 
15  Weber, Economia e Società, 1: 80 - 81, 103 -107; 2: 260 - 262.
24     ACADEMICUS - INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL
sociohistorical upheavals, as far as Weber is concerned. “Power,” “leaders” change, 
but the “functi on” of bureaucracy, its “specifi c technique” of performing all the 
duti es of power, remains. It is transformed but cannot be eliminated. The potency 
that such a specialized knowledge in the bureaucracy involves, in reality increased by 
the competence acquired on the job (from which there is derived the concept of the 
“oﬃ  cial secret,” analogous to the commercial secrets of the fi rm), only the capitalist 
entrepreneur can oppose.16
Only the private interest in profi t can, indeed, in the context of its own interest, 
att ain the specialized knowledge and awareness of things which can free him from 
the dominance of the rati onal wisdom of bureaucracy, which thereby becomes a 
tool in his own hands. Elsewhere, bureaucracy, out of the need to be able to choose 
freely the best qualifi ed functi onaries, creates within itself the conditi ons for bringing 
about a certain kind of leveling; it tends, too, to create the “power of formalisti c 
impersonality”, which allows it to discharge in a purely technical manner - as regards 
“anyone” - the objecti ve duti es involved in a parti cular department. As we have 
seen, there are two basic characteristi cs to Weber’s bureaucracy: “permanence” and 
the functi on of “rati onalizati on.” Once in being, bureaucracy becomes the hardest 
social structure to throw down. Elsewhere, it represents the most suitable means 
for transforming “community acti on” into “social acti on,” rati onally ordered. It is at 
the same ti me an imposing instrument for “socializati on” in the hands of whoever 
has control of the bureaucrati c apparatus.17 Any “mass” resist ance is bound to 
succumb in face of the characteristi c indispensability of a “conti nuous,” “functi oning,” 
“impersonal” apparatus. The bureaucrati c phenomenon, apart from having its own 
social and economic conditi ons, is also able to generate them; this is especially the 
case where the distributi on of power and the directi on provided to the apparatus of 
those who use its powers are involved.18 The rati onalizing functi on of this structure 
permits an understanding of the current and potenti al capacity of politi cal and 
16  At the beginning, the coming of the charismati c leader may reduce or overthrow the existi ng type of bureaucracy. Later, it 
turns out that the latt er acquires a new force according to strength of the requirement to observe the duti es the "new law" 
imposes.
17  One should remember in this context the famous criti cism of the "indefi nite progress of the bureaucrati zing tendency," 
lately set out convincingly by R. K. Merton. However, we must look elsewhere for the valid aspect of Weber's insight - in having 
pointed out a common, indeed isomorphic, tendency in capitalism and socialism as rati onal systems.
18  An important fact regarding modem capitalist bureaucracy is its relati ve independence from state bureaucracy. The latt er has 
characteristi cs in common with military organizati on, as the modem army has a pronounced bureaucrati c character, in contrast 
with feudal armies, for example. However, it is important that two of the most characteristi cally capitalist societi es (including 
those of older origin), England arid the United States, are in fact those, of all the great modem powers, in which the army has a 
slighter infl uence on social structure as compared with the major European states. These facts show that capitalist bureaucracy 
has an independent development. Cf. T. Parsons, La strutt ura dell'azione sociale (Bologna: II Mulino, 1962), p. 626.
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industrial capitalism, as against Marx, for whom the system of the capitalist economy 
is dominated by internal contradicti ons and class confl ict.19
Charisma and Routine
However, the confi nes of the formalism and routi nizati on of bureaucrati c procedures 
did not escape Weber’s noti ce. The concept of “charismati c power” also helps Weber to 
counterbalance certain consequences of the acti vity of bureaucrati c power. Especially 
in relati on to events in Germany during and aft er the First World War, Weber concludes 
by posing the dilemma of bureaucracy - presented as lying between the alternati ves 
of organizati onal eﬃ  ciency and the formalizati on of confl icts, characteristi c of every 
sociological experiment and observati on of the phenomenon: the problem, in short, 
of the relati ons between bureaucracy and bureaucrati zati on, or
between the development of organizati ons which promote and facilitate the 
achievement of certain ends. They provide services, fully performing important 
functi ons, but are in contrast with the phenomenon of an ever-increasing 
absorpti on of uncontrollable powers from the side of these organizati ons.20
Weber sees bureaucracy as a compendium of rati onality and technical eﬃ  ciency - an 
autonomous body, full of benefi cent power desti ned to rati onalize the life and acti vity 
of society: but it is really the concept of “rati onalizati on” which appears problemati c 
for him, and does not seem suﬃ  ciently clarifi ed.
Using Mannheim’s famous disti ncti on,21 we can say that Weber left  obscure the 
diﬀ erenti ati on between a functi onal type of rati onalizati on as technical efi fi ciency, 
and “substanti al” rati onalizati on. He was certainly aware of, and could demonstrate, 
the diﬀ erences between some forms of ancient bureaucracies and the modern 
organizati on of industry and public administrati on, but it is also the case that to use 
the measure of eﬃ  ciency and producti vity so plainly could more than once be of litt le 
assistance in evaluati ng and prompti ng rati onalizati on. One may argue that Weber 
ends up by counterposing to the undervaluati on of the bureaucrati c phenomenon 
by historical materialism a symmetrical positi on: however, one of the opposite kind, 
19  The principle of the separati on of the labourer from the material means of exercise of authority is wholly accepted by Weber, 
and use of this principle allows for a broader and deeper analyti cal extension applicable to a wider number of phenomena. It 
is common to the modern state exercise of power, and its civilizati on in a politi cal and military sense, and to private, capitalist 
industry. In both cases, the disposability of these means is in the hands of the power to which the design of the bureaucracy 
conforms. This design is characteristi c of all these organizati ons, and its existence and functi on is indissolubly linked, both 
as cause and eﬀ ect, with the concentrati on of the material means of its exercise. Again, the hierarchical dependence of the 
worker, the shop assistant, the technician, the government or military functi onary rests on a totally technical foundati on. For 
the instruments, supplies, and the fi nancial means indispensable for the maintenance and independence of the economy are 
concentrated for deployment on the one hand by the entrepreneur, and on the other by the politi cal leader or government. Cf. 
M. Weber, Parlamento o governo nel nuovo ordinamento della Germania (Bari: Laterza, 1919), p.23.
20  S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Bureaucrati zati on in German', Current Sociology 7 (1958): 103.
21  K. Mannheim; L'uomo e la società in una età di ricostruzione (Milan: Ed. Comunità, 1959), pp. 50 - 79.
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employing a kind of rati onalisti c overesti mati on of the phenomenon. In modern 
society the growing process of bureaucrati zati on takes place simultaneously with the 
process of socializati on. This process - for Weber - is irreversible, and he sees it as 
highly improbable that there can be any working out of means suitable for containing 
it. Nonetheless, for Weber, this is what should be att empted, in order to conserve part 
of “free humanity” and bring individuals to an awareness of their rights. This could 
provide hope for a new; diﬀ erent “meaning” to give to the unstoppable “bureaucrati c 
travail” and lessen for man the dangers of hypostases in terms simply of calculati on, 
eﬃ  ciency, and producti vity.
Possibly only in some remarks by Nietzsche, whose work Weber was familiar with, 
are there criti cal demands as passionate as they are tormented concerning the 
bureaucrati c travail,” like those the theorist of bureaucrati c power was setti  ng forth 
aft er the Protestant ethic. Weber said that
the puritan wanted to be a professional, while we have to be. Just as ecstasy 
was taken from monasti c cells to professional life and began to dominate lay 
existence, it helped to build the powerful economic order - linked to technical 
and economic presuppositi ons about mechanical producti on - which now 
determines extraordinary strictly the style of life of each individual. Perhaps it 
will conti nue to do this unti l the last ton of coal is burnt: to determine the life - 
style of everyone born in this system, not those taking part in purely economic 
acti vity. Concern for  material possessions should - for the “chosen” - be wrapped 
around like a light cloak, easily thrown oﬀ , in Baxter’s view. However, desti ny 
made that cloak a steel cage.22
This concern returns pressingly and sti ll more dramati cally as a persistent Leitmoti v 
in Weber’s Politi cal writi ngs. Weber, as regards the form of method, rejects any 
“substanti al” (substanti elle) noti on of collecti ve groupings, in order to start from, and 
preserve - in his analysis - the individual (Einzelindividuum). Here, too, regarding the 
aimless perfecti on which in his view seems an essenti al characteristi c of bureaucrati c-
formal orders, typical of technically advanced societi es on the way to being totally 
administered (to use Horkheimer’s formulati on), Weber’s analysis easily overcomes 
the limits of a simply psychosocial phenomenology so as to broaden out more oft en 
into “structural explanati ons.” That is, to expand into propositi on at the basis of which 
it is a social formati on, not an individual, which determines certain consequences for 
itself and other social formati ons. In the 1909 meeti ng of the Verein fur Sozialpoliti k, 
Weber noted that if
we look at a purely technical, eﬃ  cient administrati on as the peak and sole ideal, 
one may certainly say - to hell with anything else. Think of the eﬀ ect of this total 
22  Weber, Sociologia delle religioni, 1: 321.
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bureaucrati zati on and rati onalizati on which we now see approaching. Every 
worker is measured in this calculati on like a cog of the machine, and increasingly 
from within he is thus compelled to feel like this, to ask himself only if perhaps 
from being a small wheel he might one day become a big wheel. It is as though 
in politi cs the craze for order - in the perspecti ve wherein those Germans 
who thought they were acti ng for the best will end up - was enough to decide 
everything. It is as though only through knowledge and will we must become 
men who serve “order” and nothing but order, and who become nervous and 
scared as soon as this order wavers for a second, and become helpless as soon as 
they are uprooted from this total incorporati on into order. Let us hope the world 
does not know that these “sons of order” are the evoluti onary development to 
which we are constantly dispatched.23
Weber perceives, therefore, and plumbs the depths of a purely instrumental rati onality, 
but he does not have the technical nor the methodological means to solve it. He 
would rather historically analyze it, with great coldness and the academic modesty 
characteristi c of him. His project of oﬀ ering us the global vision of everything involved 
- as simultaneously cause and eﬀ ect - in the makeup of the social is unquesti ona-
bly fascinati ng. However, his limits are equally undeniable. They are plain in the very 
ti tle of his major work: not “economy” as against, under, before, or aft er “society,” 
but “economy and society.” That is, we have the economic framework together with 
the cluster of varied, multi dimensional, contradictory social facts in equilibrium; at 
the same level, with a tendency to stand fast, if not freeze - despite their anti nomies 
- they remain in unstable equilibrium. Only the will, the projects of individuals by 
chance (“charismati cally”) possessed by “Catalinarian rage” of the demon of acti on, 
will be able to set these things in moti on - unpredictably, or by means of an inscrutable 
“desti ny.”
It may seem paradoxical that the theorist of the modem world as a totally calculable 
world should arrive at such a conclusion. However, this is also the proof of his rigorous 
intellectual honesty which led him to reject the illusory promises of “sacrifi ed” history 
and the recipes of ideological speculati ons passed oﬀ  as intersubjecti vely binding 
scienti fi c certainti es. This is the atti  tude of a sociologist who rejects consolatory 
shortcuts, by being sati sfi ed with the role of the imparti al and unbending witness to 
the crisis. Among the many duti es of sociology he never accepted, sti ll less counseled, 
consolati on at all costs.
Mar Webers Limitations
The richness and depth of Weber’s analysis are beyond questi on. However, there is 
sti ll a questi on regarding what was menti oned in the third part of this arti cle: Weber, 
23  M. Weber, Scritti   Politi ci (Catania: Giannott a, 1970), pp. 112 -115.
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as a committ ed intellectual, from the podium of his university chair and from that of 
politi cal journalism, did not foresee the rise of Nazism. With the introducti on of Arti cle 
48 into the Weimar consti tuti on one may even argue that unconsciously he assisted 
it.
How is this? How could this famous scholar, troubled by scruples concerning the 
accuracy of documents involving ancient Eastern religions to the point of losing sleep 
over them, then so grossly fail down when there was a questi on of the immediate 
politi cal future of his country? How could this champion of autonomous research 
have been so shortsighted when faced with the impending ruin of the Weimar 
Republic, which portended the coming to power of Nazism? What is the hidden 
reason for this complete blindness, which seems to damage quite unexpectedly 
his extraordinary analyti cal acuteness? The surprising element is sti ll more evident 
if we think about the disturbing fact that, as regards the details of the European 
politi cal and cultural situati on, Weber gave ample proof of excepti onal perspicacity. 
He foresaw the fragmentati on and politi cal segmentati on which would result from 
adopti ng the electoral law of proporti onal representati on. He has no illusions, and 
indeed describes extremely accurately the emergence of, and the sociopsychological 
type of, the professional politi cian, who no longer lives for politi cs but oﬀ  it. He is more 
analyti cal than Marx, but also than Werner Sombart as regards industrial complexes 
and bureaucrati c hyperdevelopment. He never ti red of presenti ng typologies of the 
city, endless catalogues of acti viti es and social types, defi niti ons, disti ncti ons, and 
subdisti ncti ons of strata, conditi ons, and power. All this is destroyed by the simple 
sociopoliti cal, economic, and cultural reality of post-Wilhelmine Germany. While the 
great sociologist set out his typologies with cultured intelligence, a former house 
painter and frustrated arti st was writi ng Mein Kampf, and expressing in it the fear 
and anguish of a defeat which was never accepted and recognized as such - the desire 
of a whole people which felt it had been cheated of victory and thirsted for a new 
conquest but did not realize it.
To understand both the merits and limits of the method and substance of Weberian 
sociology this questi on is basic. However, this questi on is never clearly raised. Rather, 
even the most incisive commentators tend to draw from Weber’s deep well all the 
materials which, by chance, they happen to need, without thinking of the constructi on 
of the whole - with the same merry thoughtlessness with which the medieval church-
builders ravaged the temples of classical anti quity. Teachers are usually destroyed 
by their disciples, and Weber did not escape this rule. We have already pointed to 
Parsons’ approach, which basically sees in Weber no more than his own forerunner. 
For Parsons, Weber began the constructi on of the general theory of the “social 
system” and intenti onally directed acti on. Too bad, Parsons seems to say, that he 
stopped half-way. There is no surprise, therefore, that it is up to Parsons to take up 
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and complete the task. Naturally, this is a total misunderstanding. Parsons is facing 
problems which do not even marginally enter into the problemati c context of Weber’s 
interests. Weber is faced with a problem of change or at least the reorientati on of an 
elite - an economic summit - social and politi cal, summoned by the increasing power 
of a Germany reunited by Bismarck to measure up to its real historic stature: its own 
suitability as regards the needs of rati onal directi on and opti mal use of human and 
material resources - clearly on the increase - so as to break defi niti vely the traditi onal 
balances in Europe, established by the Congress of Vienna and already fl awed by the 
1870 Franco-Prussian War. Parsons has to discharge, more or less consciously, a quite 
diﬀ erent functi on.
Even before 1940 - The Structure of Social Acti on dates from 193624 - and especially 
from the years immediately following the war, setti  ng himself up as the interpreter of 
the re-emergence of a systemati c claim from the social sciences, Parsons quietly began 
a discussion which perfectly suited the deepest needs of American society. There is 
no doubt that in both his manner of thought and his life-style, Parsons belonged to 
the descendants of the great cultural systemati zers and the “lay popes.” However, 
one should see these things from closer at hand. The America which was a victor in 
the Second World War was radically diﬀ erent from the America of the prewar period. 
Whitman’s verse was a long way oﬀ ; the crude simplicity of the pioneers, their domesti c 
virtues - a memory ti nged with rhetoric - the innocence of a whole new world, beyond 
the complicated entanglements of confl icti ng ideologies and the defi ling struggles of 
power politi cs, was lost forever.
Almost by surprise, America found itself aft er the Second World War in an essenti ally 
new positi on, now distant from any concrete possibility of isolati onism and irremediably 
involved in world aﬀ airs. It was an uncomfortable positi on, to which middle Americans 
and the ruling classes themselves were unaccustomed, but it was inevitable. Once 
Wilson’s moralism and rigid Puritanism had spent itself in the immediate postwar 
period, the United States had been able to return to its normal framework, having 
obviously made good bargains. Having entered the war in 1917 when the die was 
already cast, with few casualti es and, all in all, litt le bother, they managed to go from 
being a debtor nati on (especially as regards France and England) to a creditor nati on, 
among moribund and starving allies. Once the armisti ce was signed, American soldiers, 
strategists, and statesmen had been able to abandon Europe and return peacefully to 
their own domesti c customs, leaving behind almost a litt le elite of writers in Paris 
and thereabouts who were to have a ball at least unti l the great crash of 1929, when 
the collapse of industrial shares on Wall Street and the adverse exchange rate of the 
dollar were, somewhat brusquely, to close the splendid Parisian interlude of Gertrude 
Stein, F. Scott  Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, and the others. In this context, despite its 
24 Parsons, La strutt ura dell’azione sociale
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meannesses - especially as regards Fitzgerald - we should remember Hemingway’s A 
Movable Feast, required reading on this phenomenon.
The period aft er the Second World War was radically diﬀ erent. The United States came 
out in a hegemonic positi on on the world scale and could no longer simply go home. In 
this profoundly altered situati on, one can grasp the deep purpose and the reason - not 
by chance - for Parsons’ desti ny. His work became emblemati c. The constructi on of 
the “social system” and the identi fi cati on of its functi onal prerequisites might appear 
as a purely theoreti cal undertaking in intellectual terms. In reality, it was the reply 
to a complex politi cal need which postwar America felt in its most sensiti ve nerve-
endings, in the tormenti ng sense of a new, unspoken imperial responsibility which 
England’s decline placed on its back: this made her insecure. It provided a sti ll emoted 
sensati on, though already perceived as an inevitable result, or a kind of murky penalty, 
that the country would not be able to go home and barricade itself within, forgetti  ng 
the Old World and its complicated intrigues and irresolvable problems. America 
was forced to face up to the external world - the “un-American” world. This was no 
choice but a questi on of survival. Beyond ideological confrontati on and questi ons of 
the empire, there were only irrelevance and historical destructi on. America had to 
acknowledge herself, sett le on her own identi ty so as to present herself as a credible 
point of reference and an ideal assembly or meeti ng point for the ideological loyalty 
of human beings.
Parsons’ “social system” is the visiti ng card of the United States. That is, it is the toughest, 
most mature att empt the country makes to recognize and identi fy itself - the att empt, 
so to speak, to “refl ect itself’ in a systemati c construct at a high level of abstracti on, in 
which the basic principles of their common life, analyti cally justi fi ed and guaranteed 
against any possible development, are laid down and established forever. This is done 
as a reply, an exorcism of the danger of falling apart before making contact with the 
“outside world,” “other” cultures.
This complex politi cal need for self-analysis and self -aﬃ  rmati on of postwar America 
is double: it has an internal and external dimension. On the internal level, this need 
shows the necessity for homogenizati on, integrati on, that it becomes an eﬀ ecti ve 
“union,” not simply as a juridical enti ty (our more perfect Union - as a society of 
immigrants, blacks and whites, people of radically diﬀ erent racial and religious origins, 
and with profoundly confl icti ng interests, beneath the oﬃ  cial credo of equality). On 
the level of internati onal and intercultural relati ons, a postwar America has not only 
to resolve the problem of the photogenic projecti on of its own image. For this, the tale 
of the returning immigrants, those who in some way made their fortune in “God’s own 
country,” would perhaps suﬃ  ce. Rather, there is a questi on of presenti ng America 
as a determinate historical reality, while simultaneously making it tend toward, or 
coincide with, the absolute, atemporal model of an industrially advanced, technically 
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progressive society. This would be done so that it might join onto and identi fy itself 
with, ulti mately, the only civil society believ able these days, empirically identi fi able 
and at the same ti me normati ve in ideal terms for all possible societi es. The confusion, 
typically American, between datum and value becomes clear in this perspecti ve: the 
confusion, that is, between what is and what ought to be. In additi on the - typically 
American - inability to see one as the other, to accept the otherness of the other, also 
becomes clear: that is, one sees the imperialisti c, “missionary” tendency to want to 
reduce the other to oneself, to project oneself, one’s values and culture, onto what is 
other than oneself. They are projected onto other cultures, other diﬀ erent values, so 
denying - along with the pluralism of cultures and values - the dialecti c and history. 
So it externalizes itself, with the level of development historically determined and 
att ained, as though it were the absolute level, the terminus of history, the end of the 
evoluti onary potenti al of humanity and of the economic, politi cal, and cultural stage 
of its common life. At the same ti me, it refuses in the specifi c historical and politi cal 
reality to understand others and to have relati ons with other peoples and cultures 
which are other than those direct or indirect dominati on.
Behind Parsons’ systemati c expositi on, there thus emerges the double politi cal need 
of the United States to integrate and cohere within, and at the same ti me to assert 
itself hegemonically at the level of internati onal relati ons. The task Weber assigns 
himself is quite diﬀ erent. The rati onalism he sees as the disti ncti ve mark of the West, 
and which he sees as triumphing in the major bureaucrati c organs and the rise of 
the modern state, should not be confused with the “instrumental acti vism” of which 
Parsons speaks. While for Weber the concern and basic preoccupati on lies in the 
raising of a responsible politi cal elite, independent of the major bureaucrats who lack 
responsibility in the full sense of the word, for Parsons politi cal tension has already 
collapsed and been diminished to the extent that politi cal directi on and administrati ve 
practi ce can be passed oﬀ  as the same thing.
Weber and the Dialectic
It is thus clear that it is impossible to see Weber as the premise for Parsons’ systemati c 
framework. The inadmissability of this concepti on rests on two basic orders of 
reasoning. The fi rst concerns the specifi c historical context to which two writers 
belong and their responses to the diﬀ erent requirements they seek. We have already 
menti oned these reasonings. The second, on the other hand, lies in the intrinsic 
logical moti ves on which, however schemati cally, we ought to dwell. In this light, 
we should fi rst point out that Weber, in clear contradicti on with Parsons’ purpose, 
nowhere shows any interest in building a “system.” The sense of historical specifi city is 
very much alive in him. Weber prefers to concentrate on the real changes in Western 
history rather than set about constructi ng a general theory of development or social 
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change or “social system.” In other words, he prefers an empirical science of concrete 
realiti es to an abstract system of global, undefi ned societi es; the specifi citi es of given, 
lived, historical life to a vague, ti meless universalism. It is, however, true that Weber 
speaks of “causal law” (Kausalgesets). However, in my view, Weber’s “causal law” has 
nothing to do with the tendenti al general laws of the Historical School, nor with the 
equally general or even generic evoluti onary principles of Spencer - nor, fi nally, with 
the evocati ve parallels, the “orders and reorders”, or the spurious generalizati ons of 
the “philosophers of history,” who constantly confuse principles of personal preference 
with scienti fi c testi ng.
The problemati c here indicated is important and can certainly not be dealt with in 
the brief remarks we can make here. Weber’s “causal law” is one of imputati on, a 
geneti cocausal att ributi on, which thus tends to delineate and disentangle the causal-
conditi onal interconnecti ons between phenomena. However, it is a causal law which 
is strictly relati ve and limited to a specifi c, well-defi ned and circumscribed historic 
context. It is thus not valid “in general”, or for other, diﬀ erent contexts, save by analogy, 
but only, rather, within the parti cular environment - that is, within a precise “historical 
horizon” (e.g., the phenomenon of capitalism within Western, only Western, history). 
From this there descends Weber’s basic idea, which is so widely misunderstood, of the 
historical individuum or unicum as the grounding object of comprehending sociology. 
Weber’s historical individuum is not the unique, irreducible, unrepeatable and thus 
unpredictable, ineﬀ able historic event of idealist historicism (from Dilthey and Rickert 
to the Italian neoidealists, especially Croce and Antoni). If it were thus, the very noti on 
of sociology as science of the historic, human event would immediately collapse. This 
“event” is stated in terms of its elements of relati ve uniformity and so, as it is never 
absolutely determinate nor indeterminate, but variously conditi oned, predictable, it 
sti ll exists within the somewhat narrow margins of the specifi c conditi ons which indeed 
weigh upon every meaningful human acti vity, acti vity directed toward an end. Thus 
for Weber, the event - intenti onal human acti on - is not ineﬀ able or unforeseeable but 
may, rather, be chosen and presented as the object of scienti fi c analysis.
Having said this, it must at once be made clear that Weber’s causal law does not 
fall into the classical ambiguiti es of the positi visti c noti on of the social fact, precisely 
thanks to the intenti onality of human acti on with which it is concerned and which 
by defi niti on escapes the “factualisti c” petrifi cati on of the naively positi visti c kind. 
However, once we have demonstrated, or at least referred to, the diﬀ erence between 
Weber’s causal law and the historicist-idealist and positi vist concepti ons, we cannot 
state that Weber launches historicodialecti cal analysis. Louis Schneider has recently 
noted that
a dialecti cal view does not necessarily contain a dubious metaphysics of culture 
or history, and should not assume that the universe itself exudes a soluti on for 
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the major social problems of man, a soluti on which will involve certain happiness. 
It may be compati ble with an empirical tendency which demands proofs of 
dialecti cal propositi ons and may very well not be sati sfi ed with a propositi on 
simply because it has a dialecti cal form or argument. It is this type of dialecti c, 
which is certainly not in confl ict with science, which seems to me clearly to fi gure 
in Weber’s thought.25
It seems to me fair to express some doubt. If one could prove the well-groundedness 
of Schneider’s interpretati on, the advantages would be obvious. A dialecti c in 
agreement with science would oﬀ er above all a way out of the old Popper-Adorno 
impasse. However, the doubt arises that from the term and concept of dialecti cs there 
follows here a strongly, improperly, reducti ve meaning. Weber was always att empti ng 
to construct analyti cal typologies, catalogues, and inventories accurate enough to 
run the risk of the accusati on of pedantry. At any rate, it seems clear that for Weber 
every law, type, or catalogue relati ng to historically specifi c, sociologically meaningful 
phenomena cannot be divorced from its intrinsically formal nature. In contrast, for 
instance, with Marx or Hegel, Weber seems to be convinced that objecti ve reality 
cannot be “latched on to,” as it were, by means of conceptual schemes (whence the 
charge - not without foundati on of neo-Kanti anism).
One might also point out, even though this appears somewhat diﬃ  cult, and certainly 
wearisome, that Weber, in his actual research procedure and style of layout, would 
not seem to be a dialecti cal sociologist - that is, that he did not act and proceed 
from the basis of an assumpti on concerning a really dialecti cal moti on in global 
social reality. His typologies (patrimonialism, bureaucracy, etc.) align elements of 
reality, abstract typifi cati ons, real - historically determinate, selected and subsumed 
- phenomena within a conceptual scheme intended to guarantee their methodical, 
rati onal reordering. This would thus provide conceptual understanding instead of 
purely subjecti ve percepti on, as it were, in Dilthey’s version of Erlebnis. Yet these 
elements, aspects, or facets which correspond to theoreti cally infi nite modes 
whereby reality presents itself us like a prism, and which Weber has the great merit 
of not reducing, petrifying and constraining into the old mechanisti c “factors,” he 
never sees as dialecti cally interacti ng in the strict sense. He collects them all on the 
same level possibility for reasons of maximum scruple for heuristi c imparti ality, and 
refuses to assert the priority of any one over another. He stops himself recognizing any 
privileged element, and thus condemns himself to paralysis, to shortsightedness, even 
blindness, as regards the dynamic of the present to which he was so att ached and to 
whose study he devoted all his energy. Indeed, to go further, through this taste for 
accurate analyti cal typology, tending toward completeness and all-inclusive, Weber is 
basically retrospecti ve. His analyses help understand the past. They are more or less 
25  L. Schneider, "Max Weber: Saggezza e scienza in Sociologia", Rassegna ltaliana di Sociologia 11 (October - December, 1970): 
536 - 537.
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silent about the present. In the last analysis, Weber, too, is paralyzed by an “excess of 
history,” to use Nietzsche’s phrase. We may discern in him foreshadowings of a new 
dialecti c, able to link empirical data and conceptual universality, and to grasp history 
in its making, through the concepti on of sociology as a parti cipati on of researches and 
objects of research. However, for Weber to set out such a new “relati onal dialecti c” 
completely, he would have had to transcend, along with his family and social origins, 
his deeply rooted eliti sm. This eliti sm was entrenched at the theoreti cal level, and in 
existenti al experience, in his methodological individualism, his tragic politi cal vision, 
wholly permeated with an unconquerable mistrust of the masses at the very moment 
he saw with dazzling clarity the historic inadequacy, the technical shortf all, and the 
mental backwardness of the elite in power.26
26  As a fi rst step toward the constructi on of a "relati onal dialecti c" I refer the reader to my Storia e storie di vita (Bari: Laterza, 
1981).
